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Abstract 
One important issue in applying CCS in Europe is the routing of the pipeline between the source and the storage. The route often
passes near inhabited areas and both economic, environmental and risk issues must be considered. Studies on pipeline routing and
quantitative risk calculation have been performed for fictive but realistic pipeline scenarios. A Geographic Information System
(GIS)-based route selection process was used for narrowing potential alternatives into one final alignment. The route selection
process was based on construction costs as well as important “soft” issues. The risks connected to the selected pipeline route were 
then analyzed using a GIS-based risk analysis system developed within the Vattenfall CCS project. In this tool the consequences of a 
leak somewhere along the pipe is calculated, together with the probability of getting the leak. By doing this for the whole pipeline the 
total societal risk can be calculated and shown in an F/N-diagram. This makes it easy to check against authority demands and also as 
part of the material used when applying for permit by giving an informative and balanced picture of the risk. GIS is used in the risk 
tool to keep book on all damage objects in the vicinity of the pipeline route, to analyze which of them are influenced by a potential 
leak and also in the calculation of the leak probability. 
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1. Introduction 
When CCS will be implemented in Europe on a large scale, CO2 transport infrastructure including a large network of 
CO2 pipelines will be needed. With such huge demand of CO2 pipelines, certain risks are bound to occur. The route 
often passes near inhabited areas and both economic, environmental and risk issues must be considered. 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is used worldwide as an efficient tool to evaluate and control risk. The required 
risk assessment must integrate all available information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences 
of a failure. 
Pipeline routing studies and risk analysis are preferably done interactively, using risk based factors in the route 
selection process and quickly checking the total risk for alternative routes. The route resulting from such an approach 
will have a high probability of fulfilling the risk criteria and only minor adjustments (due to risk considerations) are 
necessary in connection with the final full risk analysis of the proposed route. 
In general, a QRA involves the determination of failure scenarios with a certain probability. These failure scenarios 
have a certain probability attributed to them based on expert judgment or heuristics; in this case experience with 
pipeline operation and failure. Source region release and dispersion modeling is then used to estimate the concentration 
of CO2 at a certain location after a period of time. In this way the exposure to CO2 can be modeled. 
2. Approach 
The task for the risk analysis is to look at all scenarios along the entire pipeline length. Studies on pipeline routing 
and quantitative risk calculation have been performed for a fictive but realistic pipeline scenario. A scenario is a 
possible way that a threat may become a real damage.  
The probability that one or more persons are killed during a scenario is compounded of: 
 The probability of a leak of a certain size and leak rate developing 
 The respective probabilities of factors governing dispersion 
 Meteorological conditions like wind direction and speed  
 Topographical features like ground roughness  
 The probability of a gas cloud of dangerous concentration reaching a damage object (depends on the two previous 
factors and the location of the damage object)  
 The probability of people being present in the damage object 
 The probability of death given a certain gas concentration 
A Geographic Information System (GIS)-based route selection process was used for narrowing potential alternatives 
into one final alignment. The route selection process was based on construction costs as well as important “soft” issues. 
The risks connected to the selected pipeline route were then analyzed using a GIS-based risk analysis system developed 
within the Vattenfall CCS project. 
There are in practice two different risk criteria that must be complied with, location-specific individual risk and 
societal risk [1,2]. In reference to social risk, even if the risk level is shown to be below the acceptance border, the 
ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) principle should always be applied, i.e. all reasonable efforts (in view of 
technical and economical possibilities) should be made to lower the risk.  
The result from the assessment of the societal risk is preferably presented in an F/N-graph. They plot the frequency 
F(N) of accidents with N or more fatalities, where N ranges upward from 1 to the maximum possible number of 
fatalities in the system. Values of F for high values of N are often of particular political interest, because these are the 
frequencies of high-fatality accidents. Because the values of both F and N sometimes range across several orders of 
magnitude, F/N-graphs are usually drawn with logarithmic scales. 
The expected number of fatalities for any specific incident is influenced by the local population density (where also 
the share of time that people are present is taken into account) and distribution. Thus, changes in the population density 
or distribution in the area around the pipeline would affect the F/N-curve, as would also changes in the share of time 
people are present. 
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Damage objects considered in the analysis are people present in buildings and at outdoor gathering places. The 
damage objects locations are treated as point objects. Contributions from general presence of persons in the landscape 
and persons in vehicles are omitted, since it has been shown that they have negligible influence on the total risk. 
3. Risk calculation workflow 
3.1. Route selection 
A GIS-based route selection process was used to provide a rational basis for narrowing potential alternative pipeline 
routes into one final alignment corridor.  
Data for all parameters that have an influence on the pipeline route and the construction cost was collected in the GIS 
database. These parameters span from direct construction costs to “good-will costs” (in a broad sense), arising from e.g. 
the experienced unease of having a CO2 pipeline near your house or the outrage over an authority decision to allow the 
pipeline to be built in an environmental protection area. The respective weight of each “cost” parameter was determined 
using AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process), which is a method of ranking by pair-wise comparison [3].  
The GIS software allowed large amounts of cost-data to be analyzed for each pipeline route alternative. It was also 
used to analyze and compare the network of possible alternatives to quickly determine the optimum route between two 
points based upon total “costs”.  
This allowed for a logical selection and ranking of alternatives, resulting in one final alignment corridor that was 
assumed acceptable to all of the stakeholders in the project.  
3.2. Probability of failure 
The probability of having a leak depends on e.g. the pipe itself (diameter, wall thickness, steel grade, corrosion 
protection, depth, age, construction errors, material flaws etc.), the ground it is placed in (settlements, groundwater etc.), 
the activities in the surroundings (rural/urban, excavation work etc.) and the transported gas (pressure, temperature, 
flow rate, impurities, water content etc.). 
There is a great amount of available failure data for pipeline systems. Most of the statistics refer to natural gas 
pipelines, a minority refer to CO2 pipelines or pipelines for other gasses or liquids. From the statistical sources it is 
possible to draw some conclusions regarding the relation between failure causes and leak sizes. The historic data 
indicates that external interference in general (and digging in particular) is the major leak cause. For a CO2 pipeline 
however, considering the relatively heavy pipes used, digging works (excavators) is not that likely to cause a leak [4]. 
For the risk analysis it has been chosen to work with four leak sizes, each of which is linked to a certain leak rate and 
a certain leak probability. Available statistics show that the overall pipeline failure frequency in Europe is coming down 
to about 0.1 per 1000km*y (=10-7/m*y) [5,6]. The failure frequency for each individual leak size class used is presented 
in Table 1. Please note that the distribution of failure rates between a full rupture and leak varies significantly between 
studies although the probability is in general estimated to be higher for a leak compared to full rupture. 
Table 1 Leak size classes and failure frequencies. 
Leak size 
class
Size range of 
equivalent diameter 
(mm) 
Diameter used for 
risk assessment 
(mm) 
Types of defects and/or 
causes considered 
Failure frequency (per 
m*year) 
Small 0-10 7 Small pores, pit corrosion, 
small cracks 
4.5 •10-8
Medium  10-50 30 Excavator tooth, drilling,  
medium crack 
3.0 •10-8
Large 50-150 100 Excavator tooth, drilling, 
piling, large crack 
1.5 •10-8
Rupture Full bore 400 Landslide, long crack 
propagation 
1.0 •10-8
 It should however be pointed out that average values from long time series should be used with care. Historic leak 
frequencies can be used as a starting point but must always be adjusted to the actual conditions of the project in 
question, see e.g. [3]. 
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3.3. Release & Dispersion 
The modeling of the dispersion of a heavy gas like CO2 is difficult and there are a number of modeling principles 
that may be used, all with pros and cons regarding the balance between ease of use and capacity for detailed modeling. 
The different model types have different application areas, from screening to detailed analysis in a research setting. One 
must always remember when choosing a model that one must strike a balance between model sophistication and 
availability (uncertainty) of data. It is thus not necessarily the case that the more complex models are the best for CO2
pipeline risk assessment.  
It is noted, that because of trade-offs between concentration levels and cloud/plume dimensions and cloud passage 
times, models that differ by factors of 2 or 3 in their predictions of maximum concentration, can when used within a risk 
assessment tool lead to similar predicted levels of risk [7]. 
For the general dispersion modeling case we have mainly used ALOHA and to some small extent SLABView.  Both 
these models are well-known, fast-running integral models that describe the bulk properties of the cloud. As a result 
from a calculation one can have a footprint, which is the contour on the ground of a certain concentration level. 
An individual at a location where the gas cloud passes is exposed to a dose, i.e. a certain concentration during certain 
duration, with a certain probability, which depends on presence (the share of time that individual is actually present at 
the location) and the footprint probability. People are present at different places with different durations, e.g. home, 
work, outdoors etc. This has been considered in the damage object specification. 
The time during which a gas cloud has a high concentration can be calculated for separate points and shown as 
concentration versus time plots. For a rupture type of pipe failure, high gas concentration levels occur only during a 
limited time, see Figure 1. In the figure, the outdoor CO2 concentration is shown as a thin red line. The ALOHA 
software also calculates the concentration indoors in a house, based on outdoor concentration and the ventilation. This 
concentration is shown as a dotted thin blue line. Three chosen Levels of Concern (LOC) are shown as red, orange and 
yellow horizontal lines, see also Table 2.  
Figure 1 Concentration versus time plot. The example showing the situation 100 m downwind for a pipe rupture (2000 kg/s), wind 
7.5 m/s, stability class D. 
The probability that a human will die as a result of an exposure to CO2 depends on the dose received and to some 
extent on the individual sensitivity. It should here be stressed that the risk analysis should be performed using the real 
lethal dose, not an allowable dose or a dose selected “on the safe side”. 
The concentration effect limits used in the analysis are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Concentration effect limits. 
Limit Effects Concentration 
[ppm] 
Exposure time 
[minutes] 
Lethal Many people die 175 000 30
LD50 Part of the population dies ( 50 %) 120 000 60 
Immobility Many people unable to escape on their own 65 000 60
3.4. Exposure 
In a quantified risk analysis one should preferably use a stochastic model to describe the gas dispersion. 
Simplifications are necessary, so we replace the real footprint with a simplified influence area. The shape and size of the 
influence area depends on the leak (flow, time etc.) and on the dispersion. The dispersion is governed by meteorological 
conditions (e.g. wind speed and direction), surface roughness etc. In this analysis, some simplifications are made 
regarding topography as the effect of possible gravity flow and topographical features are not included. To reduce the 
computations to a manageable size, we have used discrete classes for leak sizes and meteorological conditions. The 
footprints are calculated for the concentrations corresponding to the three consequence classes.  
To find if a damage object (Oi) is threatened the following procedure is used: 
A specific influence area Ai is allowed to move along the pipeline. This is equivalent of saying that a leak has 
developed somewhere along the pipeline. Observe that the influence area has the same geometry all along the pipeline. 
This is a simplifying assumption equivalent to saying that the wind conditions etc. are the same all along the pipeline. 
For all damage objects the consequences of influence area Ai is calculated, together with the respective distance dAiOi
(length along the pipeline at which Oi is affected by Ai). This is repeated for all modelled possible influence areas, with 
different leak sizes and meteorological conditions. In practice, this means that the GIS-tool is used to move all modelled 
influence areas one at a time along the pipeline to estimate the impact on each damage object. 
The part of the pipeline where a leak can affect a certain damage object for a certain meteorological and leak size 
scenario is called “d”. It is used for calculating the probability of getting a leak that affects the damage object in 
question, as the pipeline leak probability is expressed as leaks per year and meters. 
To estimate the total risk, all such influence areas are allowed to “travel” along the entire length of the pipeline. Then 
all probabilities and connected consequences are added up for all influenced damage objects to arrive at the total risk 
(Figure 2).  
Figure 2 Principle for the estimation of the part of the pipeline where a leak can affect a certain damage object for a certain
meteorological and leak size scenario. 
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4. Assessing and presenting the risk 
Tools such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) now routinely appear on desktops and laptops in planning and 
environmental departments, with user interfaces that make the software appear simple to use, which often masks its 
power and complexity. All these functions are currently being harnessed for risk analysis through a Vattenfall research 
team developing a GIS-based model to analyze risks and to further understand possible limits, knowledge gaps and 
extensions to commercially available risk analysis tools. 
The GIS software allowed large amounts of cost-data to be analyzed for each pipeline route alternative. It was also 
used to analyze and compare the network of possible alternatives to quickly determine the optimum route between two 
points based upon total “costs”. This allowed for a logical selection and ranking of alternatives, resulting in one final 
alignment corridor that was assumed acceptable to all of the stakeholders in the project.  
Information about damage objects has been gathered in a 2-4 km wide corridor surrounding the conceptual pipeline 
corridor. It is assumed that all individuals present at a damage object are unprotected, i.e. that the outdoor 
concentrations are used for the consequence assessment. For each type of damage object, the share of total time that 
people are expected to be present has also been assessed. 
In the examples presented, a maximum acceptable risk level of 10-6/year has been used for the location specific 
individual risk. This is the level of acceptable individual risk that is most common internationally and which is also 
proposed for the EU [2]. 
In Figure 3 are shown the 10-6/year iso-risk contours for the location specific individual risk connected with the 
studied pipeline route.  
Figure 3  Risk contours as a result of the location-specific risk calculation. The pipeline route is indicated in blue. The 10-6/year risk 
curve, situated about 200 meters from the pipeline, is indicated in red. 
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As can be seen there are some buildings close to the iso-risk contours and one might consider a change of route or 
trying to lower the individual probability. One might for instance lower the probability of a leak occurring (fencing of 
right-of-way area, deeper placement, thicker pipe walls) but in some cases one might also consider a detailed study 
regarding the time that people are present.  
In Figure 4 the societal risk is shown in the form of a calculated F/N-curve. As can be seen the calculated curve falls 
well below the acceptance line. However, one might consider the ALARA principle and make a more detailed analysis 
of which damage objects contribute the most to the cases with 2 or more and 3 or more fatalities and perhaps take some 
localized action to reduce risk.  
Figure 4 Computed F/N-curve for the fictive example. 
5. Summary 
Safe transportation of CO2 is an important issue in the developing field of CCS. A leakage from a high-pressure 
transportation facility could result in damage to the environment and be a hazard to people, depending on the total 
amount of CO2 released to the atmosphere and the concentrations achieved. 
The main purpose of this study was to increase our knowledge regarding how to perform quantified risk calculations 
regarding pipeline transportation of high-pressurized CO2. A risk analysis methodology has therefore been developed to 
meet the two main demands; it should meet the Authority requirements and it should be practically manageable with 
regards to time and resources. 
The relationships that are most significant in CO2 risk analysis and modeling are largely spatial. The synthesis of 
data and the mapping of the spatial relationships between hazard phenomena (gas leak and spread, meteorological 
conditions, etc.) and the elements at risk (people, buildings, infrastructure, etc.) are preferably facilitated by the use of 
tools such as a GIS. 
Main advantages of the presented methodology: 
 The methodology used considers actual conditions in suitable detail. 
 It is transparent regarding data used, as there are no diffuse assumptions “on the safe side”. 
 It fulfils authority demands on risk analysis and can present both individual and societal risk. 
 It is fast, so different pipeline routes can easily be checked. 
 The GIS aided risk analysis methodology adds database-querying capabilities to the risk assessment. 
 The presented methodology allows that pipeline routing studies and the risk analysis are done interactively, using 
risk based factors in the route selection process and quickly checking the total risk for alternative routes. The route 
resulting from such an approach will have a high probability of fulfilling the risk criteria and only minor adjustments 
(due to risk considerations) are probably necessary in connection with the final full risk analysis of the proposed 
route.
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